Monday, April 1, 2013

1303.7435 (Charles H. Bennett et al.)

On the security of key distribution based on Johnson-Nyquist noise    [PDF]

Charles H. Bennett, C. Jess Riedel
We point out that arguments for the security of Kish's noise-based cryptographic protocol have relied on an unphysical no-wave limit, which if taken seriously would prevent any correlation from developing between the users. We introduce a noiseless version of the protocol, also having illusory security in the no-wave limit, to show that noise and thermodynamics play no essential role. Then we prove generally that classical electromagnetic protocols cannot establish a secret key between two parties separated by a spacetime region perfectly monitored by an eavesdropper. We note that the original protocol of Kish is vulnerable to passive time-correlation attacks even in the quasi-static limit. Finally we show that protocols of this type can be secure in practice against an eavesdropper with noisy monitoring equipment. In this case the security is a straightforward consequence of Maurer and Wolf's discovery that key can be distilled by public discussion from correlated random variables in a wide range of situations where the eavesdropper's noise is at least partly independent from the users' noise.
View original: http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435

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